In perspective: Tom Nairn by Davidson, Neil
Strathprints Institutional Repository
Davidson, Neil (1999) In perspective: Tom Nairn. International Socialism, 82. pp. 97-136. ISSN
0020-8736
Strathprints is designed to allow users to access the research output of the University of Strathclyde.
Copyright c© and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual authors
and/or other copyright owners. You may not engage in further distribution of the material for any
profitmaking activities or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute both the url (http://
strathprints.strath.ac.uk/) and the content of this paper for research or study, educational, or
not-for-profit purposes without prior permission or charge.
Any correspondence concerning this service should be sent to Strathprints administrator:
mailto:strathprints@strath.ac.uk
http://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/
In perspective: Tom Nairn 
NEIL DAVIDSON 
The 1960s saw an upsurge of separatist nationalisms at the core of the capitalist 
system, with the movements in Catalonia, Eskudai, Occitania, Quebec, Scotland, 
Wallonia and Wales all making their first serious impact during that decade. 
Nationalist demands went on to play a role-—although by no means the most 
important role--in the social upheavals which shook the capitalist system between 
1968 and 1976. And although none of them succeeded in establishing new states, 
several--Catalonia, Quebec and, more recently, Scotland--gained a significant 
degree of formal autonomy within the state framework of the dominant nation. 
These events inspired a number of important studies of nationalism, the majority of 
which appeared in two clusters. The first appeared between 1977 and 1982 and the 
second between 1989 and 1992, following a further and, in terms of establishing 
new states, more successful revival of nationalist aspiration in Eastern Europe. 
Whatever criticisms might be levelled at these works the best have nevertheless 
helped to advance our understanding of the phenomenon in important, if partial, 
ways.1 
Only a minority of these studies approached the question from an avowedly 
Marxist perspective. One of them was by the Scottish writer Tom Nairn, who is 
regarded by many as the foremost modern theoretician of the subject. It is ironic, 
therefore, that his contribution emphasised the supposed inadequacy of the Marxist 
tradition as a tool for understanding nationalism, persuading many on the left that, 
in the famous opening sentence of one key essay, 'The theory of nationalism is 
Marxism's greatest historical failure'.2 Most of the essays in which he put forward 
these arguments were collected in a book first published in 1977 called The Break-
Up of Britain, but Nairn has recently returned to the subject in a further collection 
of essays called Faces Of Nationalism. On the evidence of this work he no longer 
considers himself to be any sort of Marxist. Indeed, it is questionable whether he 
can in any sense still be described as belonging to the left. Nairn is no longer 
merely a theorist of nationalism--Marxist or otherwise--but a nationalist theorist, 
advocating nationalism not only for his own nation, but as a universal political 
programme for the peoples of any potential nation states, in much the same way as 
revolutionary socialists argue for working class power. The extent to which Nairn 
has abandoned not only Marxism, but socialism itself, has been missed by both his 
critics and his supporters.3 Such misunderstandings should not be allowed to 
continue. What Nairn advances is nothing less than a theoretical justification for 
the endless subdivision of the world into competing capitalist nation states. 
With the collapse of Stalinism and reduction of social democracy to the most 
servile position it has ever held in relation to capital, there is a powerful tendency 
for nationalism to become the vehicle for local opposition to the effects of the 
global crisis. This is certainly true in Scotland itself, where disillusion with the 
Blair government has already led to increased levels of support for the Scottish 
National Party. And while it has never been true that working class support for the 
SNP necessarily reflected an increased level of nationalism, the danger is that it 
might become true.4 Avoidance of that possibility will depend, at least to some 
extent, on socialists successfully demonstrating to other workers that nationalism is 
not a solution to our problems but a manifestation of them. One aspect of that 
demonstration, although by no means the most important one, is to challenge the 
type of theory advanced by Nairn, where nationalism is presented not only as 
desirable, but natural and inevitable. The first part of this article therefore traces 
the development of Nairn's theory of nationalism; the second is a critique of his 
current position. 
Part 1: Nairn's theory of nationalism--from history to human nature 
Nairn writes, 'I have never hidden the fact that my own dilemmas and oddities 
emanate from those of my country, Scotland'.5 In fact for the first part of his 
writing career, between 1962 and 1968, Nairn showed no discernible interest in 
Scotland whatsoever, but devoted his attentions to constructing a thesis on English 
development with Perry Anderson, then editor of New Left Review. This Anderson-
Nairn thesis owed far more to Nairn than to Anderson, at least in its original 
formulation.6 For the purposes of this article the most important aspect of the 
thesis, in relation to the direction subsequently taken by Nairn, concerns the 
supposedly archaic nature of the British state. It was only in this context that 
Scottish nationalism, and through it nationalism in general, became the focus of 
Nairn's work. 
The British state, the working class and the Labour Party 
Nairn acknowledges that the combined effects of the Civil War and the Glorious 
Revolution were to establish a fundamentally capitalist economy in England. He 
argues, however, that because these events occurred at such an early stage in 
capitalist development, the English bourgeoisie, unlike the French Jacobins a 
hundred years later, did not require a theoretical understanding of the revolution it 
had made. Consequently, the culture of the new ruling class was shaped by the 
more established and durable values of the landowning aristocracy who exercised 
hegemony over their immature junior partner, the bourgeoisie proper. Unlike other 
bourgeoisies which followed it to power, the English bourgeoisie did not become 
conservative after its economic power was assured, because it had always been 
conservative. This state, consolidated in England by 1688, and, by extension, in 
Scotland after the Union of 1707, was therefore pre-modern in structure: 'Although 
not, of course, an absolutist state, the Anglo-British state remains a product of the 
general transition from absolutism to modern constitutionalism: it led the way out 
of the former but never genuinely arrived at the latter'.7 The pre-modern character 
of the British state was preserved beyond the term of its natural life by the spoils of 
empire, which rendered any subsequent 'modernisation' unnecessary for the ruling 
class. Ultimately, however, when the British state was overtaken by modernising 
rivals and undermined by the retreat from empire, it entered an almost permanent 
condition of crisis which no government of either left or right has been able to 
resolve. 
Superficially, this analysis bears some resemblance to that advanced by Trotsky in 
his writings on Britain.8 But although Trotsky was perfectly aware of what Alex 
Callinicos calls the 'disadvantages of priority', he also situated this in the context of 
the world system and argued that the resultant crisis could be resolved by the 
working class.9 Nairn, however, focuses almost exclusively on the national arena 
and does not accept the revolutionary potential of the English working class. Here 
too he regards the early formation of English capitalism as decisive. The English 
working class was formed in the classic period of bourgeois revolution (1789-
1848), but because the English bourgeoisie had already achieved its victory, the 
former fought alone for political rights and social progress, unaided by the petty 
bourgeois insurgencies characteristic of the rest of Europe. Defeated, the working 
class was forced into a form of 'apartheid': the separateness of a class all too aware 
of what distinguished it culturally from other classes, but unable to identify the 
opposed interests which this also involved. Marxism, which might have clarified 
the situation, was available to the English working class only after it had already 
entered into its caste-like isolation within bourgeois society. 
According to Nairn these characteristics were inherited by the political party which 
is usually thought to speak for English workers. Dominated by a bureaucratic 
gradualist right, besotted by the supposed wonders of the British constitution, and 
opposed only by a succession of moralistic but impotent 'lefts', the Labour Party 
was a useless instrument for achieving socialism. Yet his critique was not based on 
the premise that Labour had betrayed its supporters, but rather that it had all too 
faithfully reflected their lack of class consciousness. 
It is not my intention to subject Nairn's analysis to detailed criticism here, since a 
massive literature exists which does precisely that.10 The main theme, however, is 
clear: the British state is an archaic formation in deep crisis, but which nevertheless 
exercises such a hold over society that no force exists which can destroy or even 
restructure it. 
Tartan waistcoats and the dreams of May 
In the beginning Scottish nationalism offered no prospects of playing a 
modernising role. Throughout the 1960s the Scottish National Party had been 
gathering electoral support almost unnoticed by political commentators of left or 
right. In 1961 their candidate polled a respectable 18.7 percent of the vote at a by-
election in Glasgow Bridgeton. The following year SNP Chairman William Wolfe 
came second to Labour candidate Tam Dayell in West Lothian with 23 percent of 
the vote--more than the Conservatives and Liberals combined. Finally, in 
November 1967, Winifred Ewing won a by-election in the previously safe Labour 
seat of Hamilton, beating Labour into second place by 18,397 votes to 
16,598.11 Nairn drew attention to the significance of these developments in an 
article for New Left Reviewwhich appeared in 1968, 'The Three Dreams of Scottish 
Nationalism', which was resolutely hostile to the nationalism of the SNP. 
Nairn argues that the Scots have undergone three successive attempts to define 
their identity. The first of these was Calvinism. Nairn correctly argues that the 
'rising bourgeoisie' did not initiate the Reformation of 1559. It was to remain 
inconsequential for another century and only achieved full dominance after 1746. 
Instead, the Church of Scotland acted both as a substitute for absent state power 
and as the unifying factor in a civil society. After the Union with England of 1707, 
the kirk was, along with the legal system, one of the institutions specifically 
preserved from the dissolution of the state. Consequently, it became the main 
vehicle through which a separate national identity was maintained. 
The second attempt was not, as might be expected, the Enlightenment, in which 
Scotland attained greater eminence than any nation apart from France, but 
Romanticism. The leading figures in the Enlightenment were not concerned with 
Scottishness, but identified themselves with the British nation politically and were 
concerned with discovering universal laws of human development: 'While the 
Enlightenment was only an episode, Romanticism entered her soul'.12 But the way 
in which it did so was markedly different from that of other European nations. 
Whereas, in Italy or Germany, Romanticism was part of the formation of national 
identity, in Scotland, particularly in the work of Sir Walter Scott, it acted as 
another substitute for it. 
The third attempt was--or more precisely, is--the modern national consciousness of 
industrial Scotland, which Nairn sees as being positively schizophrenic. One 
element is the debased romanticism of a popular culture which then still revolved 
around tartan and bagpipes, whisky and haggis, the Loch Ness Monster and 
Greyfriars Bobby, Calvinism and a militarist celebration of the Scottish 
contribution to the British Empire. The other is the 'ethereal tartanry' of the 
intelligentsia, which begins as a rejection of such images of Scotland, but 
ultimately reproduces them at a more refined level. 
Nairn notes that the SNP represents 'bourgeois nationalism', a political formation 
which socialists have seen as historically justified in only two situations--first, 
during the original bourgeois revolutions which completed the transition from 
feudalism to capitalism, and second as the means by which mainly non-European 
peoples have mobilised to liberate themselves from the imperialism of these 
original capitalist nation states. Scotland had long since accomplished the first and 
consequently has no requirement for the second.13 Nevertheless, Nairn argues that 
there are two reasons why the national aspirations of the Scots must be supported. 
First, 'as a blow against the integrity of British imperialism' and secondly, 'because 
it represents some transfer of power to a smaller arena'.14 The first is certainly a 
legitimate reason for not opposing Scottish separatism; the second is more 
problematic, suggesting that a government in Edinburgh might be politically, 
rather than merely geographically, closer to the people who elected it than one in 
London. However, instead of supporting the SNP, Nairn argues Scottish socialists 
must develop their own form of nationalism with which to oppose bourgeois 
nationalism: 'Is it really impossible that Scotland, which has dwelt so long and so 
hopelessly on the idea of a nation, should produce a liberated, and revolutionary 
nationalism worthy of the name and the times?'15 
The events of May 1968 in France had an effect on Nairn. He wrote a collaborative 
contribution to the literature of May during a struggle in which he was personally 
involved: the occupation of Hornsey College of Art in London. In a revised version 
of 'The Three Dreams of Scottish Nationalism', included in the 1970 
collection Memoirs Of A Modern Scotland, in which the counterposition of 
revolutionary socialism to Scottish nationalism is strengthened still further, Nairn 
notes that the 'tartan waistcoated bourgeoisie' had not remained unchallenged: 'I do 
not want to turn aside either from Scotland's native tradition of working class 
protest, John Maclean, Clydeside radicalism, or the communist tradition of the 
miners.' The problem was that these alternatives had never come close to 
dislodging their class enemies. Bourgeois nationalism, however, was a false 
solution to the problem, proposing as it did a false unity of interest between 
different classes. Nairn goes on to argue that the Scots have two choices, one of 
which leads into 'the prison of an archaic bourgeois nationality', and the other to a 
'revolutionary' consummation which would destroy the prison and lead towards a 
'real, meaningful future existence'. Nairn makes it clear that the latter possibility 
has been inspired by 1968: 
I for one am enough of a nationalist, and have enough faith in the students 
and young workers of Glasgow and Edinburgh, to believe that these forces 
are also present in them. I will not admit that the great dreams of May 1968 
are foreign to us, that the great words on the Sorbonne walls would not be 
at home on the walls of Aberdeen or St Andrews, or that Linwood and 
Dundee could not be Flins and Nantes. Nor will I admit that, faced with a 
choice between the Mouvement du 22 mars and Mrs Ewing, we owe it to 
'Scotland' to choose the latter. 
This counterposition of a specifically Scottish socialist alternative to the bourgeois 
nationalism of the SNP constituted Nairn's first concession to the latter. Why did 
'the great dreams of May 1968' have to be considered in a purely Scottish context 
in the first place? Nevertheless, the overall tone of the piece is clearly aligned with 
the revolutionary movement of the time. This was not to last. 
European integration and British disintegration 
In 1972, at a time when the class struggle in Britain was at the highest level since 
1919, Nairn devoted an article, comprising the whole of New Left Review 75, to a 
critique of the dominant left positions on British entry to the Common Market, as 
the European Union was then known. His central argument was that although there 
had indeed been a major upturn in the industrial class struggle, it had failed to find 
new organisational forms. At the same time the Labour Party, the TUC, the 
Communist Party and the revolutionary left were all engaged in channelling the 
massive levels of worker discontent into the relatively safe question of opposition 
to British entry to the Common Market, tying the left to supporting British 
nationalism.16 
Two aspects of this argument should be noted as foreshadowing his current 
position. The first is the assertion that when the British left counterpose socialist 
internationalism to the capitalist Common Market, they are 'really' using this as a 
cover for defending the integrity of the British imperialist state. The second is that 
Nairn now sees the only possibility of transforming the British state in any 
direction as coming from forces external to the state itself--in this case the supra-
national institutions of Western European capital. 
It was in this context that Nairn returned to the subject of Scottish nationalism, in 
the aftermath of the second important SNP by-election victory, at Govan during 
November 1973. The tone was now very different. The article in question, 
'Scotland and Europe', which appeared in New Left Review early in 1974, is much 
more concerned with a historical analysis of Scottish distinctiveness than the 
nature of the SNP and, in this respect, it may be the best thing he has ever written. 
Nairn begins with the central problem: the absence of Scottish nationalism during 
the periods when other national movements dominated European politics. Why did 
it only take political form in the 1920s, at the very moment the modern European 
state system had taken shape? Only a detour through a general theory of 
nationalism gave Nairn the answer. He wrote that, 'Nationalism, unlike nationality 
or ethnic variety, cannot be considered a "natural" phenomenon.' Instead, it must 
be defined as 'mobilisation against the unpalatable truth of grossly uneven 
development'.17 The modern capitalist world emerged from the combined pressures 
exerted by the British Industrial Revolution and the French Revolution. These 
forced all other states into copying their achievements in order to compete 
effectively with or be dominated by their more advanced rivals. But this could not 
be simply an acceptance of 'progress' as defined by the front runners, it also 
necessitated a rejection of progress in the terms on which they offered it. This 
process, which is more or less parallel with that of the bourgeois revolution, spread 
out from the unifications of Germany and Italy during the 1860s to contemporary 
national liberation movements in places as different as Ireland and Bangladesh. 
Where did Scotland fit in to this dualist view of historical development? Uniquely, 
Nairn argued, through the Union of 1707, Scotland 'exploited' the achievements of 
the English bourgeois revolution, thus entering--indeed, helping to define--the 
advanced world of capitalism. Scottish capitalist development was fully attained 
before the age of nationalism began and so, although Scotland had all the 
ingredients necessary for a nationalist movement--a rising bourgeoisie, an 
intelligentsia, a popular tradition of hostility to England, a national church--no 
social class required such a movement. 
The political implications of this analysis did not become clear until the following 
year, when an essay by Nairn called 'Old and New Scottish Nationalism' appeared 
in a collection called The Red Paper On Scotland, edited by the current Chancellor 
of the Exchequer in an earlier, more left wing incarnation. Nairn now argued that, 
like several other areas in Western Europe, Scotland was experiencing the rise of 
what he called neo-nationalism. In the Scottish case, the arrival of American based 
oil companies in the North Sea had provided a functional equivalent of the 
imperialist intrusions which had provoked 'modernising', 'developmental' 
nationalisms of which Scotland had previously no need. Here Nairn dismisses the 
earlier analysis of 'Three Dreams', which assumed that Scottish self-determination 
would come as a result of socialism, as based on 'two misjudgments': 'overestimate 
of socialist potential and underestimate of capitalism's ability to mutate further'. 
According to Nairn, 'the left had pinned too much faith on the rationality of 
working class based struggle (understood as a potentially international force), and 
far too little upon the non-rational strengths of nationalism.' In these circumstances 
socialists had little option but to accept the continued influence of nationalism: 'In 
my view it has become totally inadmissible to oppose such tendencies in the name 
of an abstract internationalism, a universal socialist or class struggle which exists 
only in aspiration'.18 
These words were written in 1975, during which the revolutionary period which 
opened in 1968 was drawing to a close. Nairn seems to have seen Scottish 
nationalism as a substitute for the inability of the working class to destroy the 
British state: 'More than any other factor, more even than the miners' strikes of 
1972 and 1974, it has exposed the senility of the old consensus and its two party 
system'.19 These claims are quite astonishing. The British state has only been in 
actual crisis (as a result of its internal contradictions, rather than war) on three 
occasions this century: first between 1910 and 1914, then in 1919 and finally 
between 1969 and 1974. On each occasion Scottish nationalism trailed some way 
after the class and anti-imperialist struggles in Ireland in the list of factors causing 
this crisis. 
In practice, Nairn treats the state in classically liberal fashion, as an autonomous 
body exercising a constricting power over society. His hatred of this state is 
undeniable, but it springs less from the fact that it exists to run society in the 
interest of the bourgeoisie, as from its inability to 'modernise'. From this 
perspective events at the summit of politics which threaten the supposed sovereign 
power of the British state take on a special significance which workplace struggles 
do not immediately seem to possess. 
In keeping with his instrumental view of nationalism, Nairn does not indulge in the 
glorification of Scottish history in the manner of more conventional Scottish 
nationalists. Indeed, if anything, he achieves the almost impossible task of both 
exaggerating the backwardness of pre-Union Scotland and the mindlessness of 
tartanry.20 For this he was denounced by two self proclaimed nationalist 
'philosophers', Craig Beveridge and Ronald Turnbull. These authors draw a 
distinction between those, like Nairn, whom they see as 'fighting for a socialist 
future' within which nationalism is simply a 'tactical possibility', and those, like 
themselves, who are fighting for 'a culture, a history, [and] a people as an integral 
part of a socialist politique'.21 In the mid-1970s this distinction was certainly still 
relevant. Nairn maintained that Scottish nationalism should be supported because it 
offered the possibility of a alternative road to socialism to the hopelessly 
economistic struggle waged by miners and the like. In 1977 he made explicit the 
perspective implied by privileging Scottish (and to a lesser extent, Welsh) 
nationalism over the class struggle: 
The fact is that neo-nationalism has become the gravedigger of the old state 
in Britain, and as such the principal factor making for a political revolution 
of some sort--in England as well as the small countries. Yet because this 
process assumes an unexpected form, many on the metropolitan left 
solemnly write it down as a betrayal of the revolution. 
...The reason is that proletarian socialism is supposed to be the gravedigger, 
and no-one else will do. So they tell the nationalists to drop their shovels 
and put up with the pathetic limits of 'devolution': the revolution will solve 
their problems along with the others. Meanwhile they should wait until the 
time is ripe--ie the time for socialism--taking a firm grip on their petty 
bourgeois, backward looking impulses. The essential unity of the UK must 
be maintained till the working classes of all Britain are ready.22 
Nairn originally developed a general theory of nationalism in order to explain the 
particular Scottish variant. Now he moved back from the particular to the general, 
taking with him the pessimism about working class politics which characterised 
'Old and New Scottish Nationalism'. In 'The Modern Janus', also written in 1975, 
he summarised his views as they had evolved over the previous seven years. First, 
it is important to note that Nairn does not pretend that all nationalisms--or indeed, 
any nationalisms--are wholly virtuous. While recognising that judgements have to 
be made about specific cases based on political criteria, Nairn maintained that this 
was not decisive. Ultimately, all nationalisms share the same contradictory nature: 
...nationalism can in this sense be pictured as like the old Roman god, 
Janus, who stood above gateways with one face looking forward and one 
backwards. Thus does nationalism stand over the passage to modernity, for 
human society. As human kind is forced through its strait doorway, it must 
look desperately back into the past, to gather strength wherever it can be 
found for the ordeal of 'development'. 
Here is the familiar analysis of the spread of nationalism after 1789 as a necessary 
response on the part of modernising elites to the uneven development of 
capitalism. Now it is accompanied with a dismissal of the independent role of the 
oppressed: 'The new middle class intelligentsia of nationalism had to invite the 
masses into history; and the invitation had to be written in a language they 
understood.' Later in the same essay Nairn argues that nationalism is inescapable in 
the core and periphery of the system alike: 'There was never any chance of the new 
universal class which figured in the Marxist doctrine emerging as "proletarians" 
rather than as "Germans", "Cubans", "Irishmen" and so on.' This is because: 
Nationalism could only have worked, in this sense, because it actually did 
provide the masses with something real and important--something that class 
consciousness postulated in a narrowly intellectualist mode could never 
have furnished, a culture which however deplorable was larger, more 
accessible, and more relevant to mass realities than the rationalism of our 
Enlightenment inheritance. If this is so, then it cannot be true that 
nationalism is just false consciousness. It must have a functionality in 
modern development, perhaps one more important than that of class 
consciousness and formation within the individual nation states of this 
period.23 
Nairn attempted to put his theory into practice by joining the Scottish Labour 
Party, the organisation set up by Labour MPs Jim Sillars and Alex Neil in January 
1976. In retrospect, the brief history of the SLP, whose membership never rose 
above 1,000, shows that there is little room in Scotland for a reformist party 
straddling the ground between the Labour Party and the SNP. For Nairn, the 
attempt by that organisation to combine socialism and nationalism in equal 
measures was its strength, as, 'We have to fight coherently on both fronts'.24 But 
events in Scotland led Nairn to abandon the socialist front. 
By 1978 the Labour government had been reduced to a minority in the House of 
Commons and was under extreme pressure both from socialists opposed to its 
attacks on trade unions and the welfare state, and a resurgent Conservative Party 
under Thatcher for not attacking trade unions and the welfare state hard enough. 
The minority Labour government was partly reliant on SNP votes at Westminster, 
and therefore needed simultaneously to undermine nationalist support while 
appearing to meet nationalist demands. The trick was to be performed by offering 
the Scots a largely powerless Assembly which, Labour ministers hoped, would 
nevertheless meet national aspirations sufficiently for Scottish independence to be 
seen off, at least for the duration of the immediate crisis. The scheme might have 
worked, but it was sabotaged from inside the Labour Party itself. The Scotland Bill 
of July 1978 offered administrative devolution, providing the proposal was backed 
by a majority of the Scottish voters in a referendum. George Cunningham, a 
Scottish MP who sat for the London constituency of Islington, introduced an 
amendment to the Bill which required 40 percent of the Scottish electorate to 
support it in a referendum, rather than a simple majority of those voting. The 
subsequent campaign saw the Labour Party split down the middle, with one wing 
supporting the 'Labour Vote No' committee and the other the 'Labour Movement 
Yes' campaign. 
Outside the Labour Party, the left in Scotland showed far greater unanimity in 
supporting devolution. The Communist Party of Great Britain had already adopted 
a policy of 'national self-determination' for Scotland in 1964. Among the orthodox 
Trotskyist organisations the International Marxist Group and supporters 
of Militant supported devolution. Only the SWP stood aside from this unusual 
display of left unanimity, standing on what might be called a position of 'malign 
abstentionism'.25 However, the point is not that the SWP took a wrong position on 
the issue--the lesson was subsequently learned--but that, contrary to what Nairn 
has subsequently claimed, the majority of the left supported devolution. 
In the end only 32.9 percent of the electorate voted 'Yes'. Indeed, only 63.8 percent 
turned out to vote at all. It is possible that the concerns of most Scots, certainly 
most Scottish workers, were elsewhere. The campaign had been conducted in the 
aftermath of the last great general wave of industrial struggle in Britain to date, the 
so-called Winter of Discontent, when the pressure from below against wage 
restraint finally forced the union leaderships to call action against the Labour 
government. Unlike the strikes between 1969 and 1975, however, these strikes 
were not imbued with feelings of optimism and hope but pessimism and despair. 
The election of a Tory government was felt by many to be inevitable months 
before the poll was announced. In the event, the SNP reaction to the inevitable 
repeal of the Scotland Act was to bring a motion of censure, supported by the 
Tories, which saw the government defeated, a general election called, and the 
election of the first Thatcher government. 
As Andrew Marr has written, 'Part of the bitterness and disillusion with which the 
Scottish political and journalistic world greeted the result [of the 
referendum]...reflected the amazement of Scotland's suburban leftish-leaning 
establishment that their views were not shared more widely throughout the 
country'.26 At the time Nairn reflected these feelings of 'bitterness' and 'disillusion', 
but did not, however, blame the Scottish people for their lack of enthusiasm for 
devolution. For Nairn the blame lay elsewhere, with the left. 
In a new endnote to an essay called 'Internationalism: a Critique', written after the 
1979 referendum, Nairn writes of the fiasco: 'In very adverse circumstances, a 
small majority had actually voted in favour of the Labour government's devolution 
Act; and yet had been frustrated by a mixture of old imperialism and the 
"internationalism" analysed here'.27 There is something in this. 'Old imperialism' is 
straightforward enough. Labour right wingers like George Cunningham and Tam 
Dayell were then, and are now, committed to defending the integrity of the British 
imperialist state against any form of constitutional reform, no matter how 
superficial, on the grounds that it will inevitably lead to separatism. What about 
'internationalism'? The same case was essentially made by the Labour left, 
although with different emphases. As Eric Heffer wrote in his memoirs, 'I feared 
that devolution for Scotland and Wales would weaken Britain as a united economic 
unit and be detrimental to socialism as a whole'.28 Nairn's error is to assume that 
every objection to Scottish nationalism must universally be based on 'Unionist' 
support for the British state. 
Reviewing the arguments of The Break-Up Of Britain in October 1981 Nairn wrote 
of his attempt to steer a course between two 'primitive but vigorous opponents' 
both advancing equal and opposite errors: 'On one side a bourgeois nationalism 
denied region and class altogether; on the other a lumpen socialism denied 
nationality any progressive significance whatever (unless its frontier ran through 
the middle of the English Channel).' He nevertheless refuses to see that any of the 
critics who were alarmed at 'the spectacle of a Marxist sympathising with the 
notoriously bourgeois nationalism of the SNP' might have had a point, dismissing 
their objections as 'bilge, the product of reheated stereotypes and the sermonising 
impulse so important to a frustrated left.' For Nairn the 'majority' who did not 
awaken to national consciousness, which presumably includes most of the working 
class, were afflicted by 'a peculiarly Scottish torpor' comprised of 'respectable 
servility' and a 'Jekyllish conformism and a fear of reversion to being "natives".'29 
Nairn allowed that, just possibly, a combination of the revived Labour left, then 
mobilised around the Alternative Economic Strategy, and the more left wing 
nationalism he saw developing in Scotland, might point towards a socialist solution 
to the crisis of the British state.30 Such hopes were quickly dashed. The Bennite 
left had already peaked by the time these cautious hopes were expressed in late 
1981 and the left within the SNP, in the shape of the '79 Group, was expelled 
during the same year. Scottish nationalism, far from recovering from the disaster of 
1979, retained a low level of support until the third Conservative electoral victory 
in 1987 brought a new dimension of support which extended far beyond the ranks 
of the SNP. Long before then, however, Nairn's fundamental pessimism reasserted 
itself. A dispute within the editorial board of New Left Review in 1982 resulted in a 
split, caused partly by personality differences, but also by the question of whether 
the decline of Stalinism, both as state power in the East and working class 
organisation in the West, could herald the revival of a genuine revolutionary 
movement. Anderson and the editor, Robin Blackburn, were at this stage still 
committed--albeit somewhat abstractly--to a perspective which saw such a 
development as being possible; Nairn sided with the faction which held that it was 
not, and after they lost the fight, he resigned in solidarity with them.31 
The remainder of the decade was largely taken up with writing his book on the 
British monarchy, The Enchanted Glass (1988), whose central thesis concerning 
the ideological dominance of the Windsors has been so comprehensively refuted 
by events that further comment is unnecessary. It was at this point, however, that 
Nairn resumed his engagement with nationalism proper. The majority of the essays 
contained in Faces Of Nationalism were written after the Eastern European 
revolutions of 1989 and they cast their shadow over its contents. Here Nairn raises 
to new extremes all the positions which he had previously held in earlier writings. 
Three themes have now emerged full blown which until now had only been hinted 
at; the identification of Marxism with Stalinism, the introduction of 'human nature' 
as an explanatory framework for the existence of nationalism and the consequent 
rejection of internationalism even as a theoretical possibility. 
Uncovering secret Stalinists 
The extent to which even nominally anti-Stalinist socialists like Nairn tended to 
identify the Stalinist states with socialism was only fully revealed after their 
collapse, when he performed the familiar exercise of rejecting Marxism along with 
the states which described themselves as Marxist. 
This then allows him to equate fascism and 'communism': 'Attempts to realise these 
prophesies--and the struggle between them--have accounted for much of the past 
century. Fortunately they ran out of steam before annihilating the species. But does 
even the most fervent optimist think this could not have happened?' 
Nairn pursues his attack on Marxism into the work of his one time inspiration, 
Antonio Gramsci. According to Nairn, Gramsci is not the advocate of civil society 
for which he is taken. On the contrary, Gramsci is alleged to have seen his purpose 
as being to destroy civil society: 
The circumstances of censored notebook composition compelled a detour 
through...pluralism, and the avoidance of an overtly anti-statist and anti-
national rhetoric. But the point of it was to lay the foundations of the 
standard internationalist state of Third International times: il moderno 
principe or radically Leninist polity within which society would be 
reconfigured to suit the vision of a commanding elite. 
Nairn does note, in passing, that Gramsci was in fact opposed to the direction 
which Stalin took the USSR and the Communist International during the 1920s and 
1930s, and that this was one of the reasons why socialists in the 1960s were 
attracted to his work. Nairn now reveals that they were mistaken: 'Behind any 
disenchantment with "crude" Russian hegemony lay a more powerful will towards, 
in Harding's words, "a transcendent tactic and sublime goal" in the sky of the new 
proletarian enlightenment'.32 Gramsci is therefore said to have harboured a 
monolithic 'statist' agenda behind the superficially open concepts employed in his 
prison notebooks--a position which echoes the earliest Cold War assessments of 
his work by American academics.33 
Humans need nations 
It seems likely that the events of 1989-1991 simply gave Nairn an occasion, rather 
than a reason, for publicly abandoning Marxism and its associated political 
commitments. Accordingly, he no longer argues for nationalism as an alternative 
road to socialism. He now argues that it is the fate of humanity because it 
corresponds to the requirements of human nature. This is extreme, even by Nairn's 
previous standards. He rightly dismisses the notion, associated with currently 
fashionable cant about globalisation, that the nation-state has run its course. 
However, his alternative is based on the opposite and equally damaging error. 
Discussing the new wave of nationalisms which have arisen since 1989, he writes, 
'If...people have not been able to help being like that (inventors of cultural 
contrasts, antagonistically differentiated, etc) then what is to prevent blood and 
accursed "human nature" coming into their own once again?' If true, these remarks 
would be the occasion for despair. But Nairn is neither despairing nor depressed, 
for such responses would be the result of misunderstandings. Nationalism, in this 
account, has been the downfall of empire, from the Dutch revolt against Spanish 
absolutism in the 16th century to the Eastern European revolt against Russian 
totalitarianism in the 20th. For this reason, it has to be welcomed, despite its 
continual splitting up of existing states: 'If the role of primordial human nature was 
greater than [Gellner's theory of modernisation] allows, however, then may it not 
be that what saved us [ie from Stalinism-ND] may also be condemning us to an 
indefinite futurity of differentiation?'34 
Although he circles evasively around the issue, distancing himself from the 
'dreadful simplicities of racism and ethnic nationalism', Nairn ultimately opts 
precisely for this oldest of reactionary creeds: 'Any new paradigm depends, in 
other words, on establishing a more plausible link between biology and kinship on 
the one hand, and the world of politics, nation states and resurgent nationality on 
the other'.35 To this end, he expects the Human Genome Project, and other research 
into the 'life sciences' more generally, eventually to prove the link between biology 
and nationhood. The same point was made more simply in an article from 1992 not 
reproduced in this collection: 
...if diversity was never merely a 'given', in the meaningless accident sense, 
a different light must be thrown upon its persistence. If internal species-
diversity through cultural means has always been 'human nature', 
presumably it will go on being so--in a way that has nothing to do with 
ideology of blood or race.36 
It should be noted that Nairn does not attempt to excuse what he calls 'blots, 
excrescences or failures' in the record of nationalism since 1989. He merely 
considers that 'the bombardment of Dubrovnick or the political rape of Muslim 
women' are a price worth paying for the downfall of the USSR and the other 
oppressor states of the Stalinist bloc: 'Insistence that the small battalions are likely 
to be "on the whole" better than the large--particularly the multi-ethnic large--does 
not imply there can be no pathology of the ethnic, or no cases where nationalists 
are wrong'.37 
In fact, Nairn does attempt to explain the genocidal aspects of nationalism. The 
problem, he claims, is not nationalism as such, but ethnic nationalism, particularly 
where it used to mobilise a peasant population whose way of life is under threat 
from 'modernisation'. On this basis, Nairn not only seeks to explain the Cambodian 
and Rwandan massacres, but the lack of violence in the history of Scottish and 
Welsh nationalism compared to that of rural Ireland.38 In a more recent article 
in New Left Review he extends this analysis to include the rise of Nazi Germany, 
identifying the centrality of rural Bavaria and its capital, Munich, in inculcating 
Fascism. Indeed, in combination with a range of other factors Nairn treats the 
persistence of peasant life and its forced entry into modernity as the prime cause of 
what he calls 'nationalist disasters'. Munich was 'a town of peasant culture', 
Cambodia and Rwanda were 'virtually 100 percent peasant', Bosnia and Serbia 
were 'less touched by the process of halting industrialisation than many outside 
observers realised', and so on.39 
In reality, these cases have little in common. The genocide in Rwanda took the 
form of an inter-peasant conflict about access to land, and was neither a rural revolt 
against the towns nor a national struggle in any recognisable sense. Cambodian 
Stalinism certainly embodied a ferocious anti-urban bias, but the victims of Khmer 
nationalism were not, in the main, killed because of their ethnicity, but because of 
their supposed opposition to the New Order: most of the bones now preserved in 
Tual Sleng extermination centre are of 'ethnic' Khmers. Indeed, the second greatest 
example of systematic internal violence in the 20th century (after Nazi Germany), 
Stalinist Russia between 1929 and 1956, can scarcely be said to have rested on 
peasant support, since at one level the industrialisation of the Soviet Union can be 
seen as a civil war waged by the bureaucracy against the peasantry. The reason 
why Irish nationalism has repeatedly been forced to resort to violence is not the 
consequence of peasant trauma at modernisation (in 1798!) but a response to the 
institutionalised violence of the British state and its Orange offshoot--and this is a 
violence which the Scots certainly have been responsible for exercising. 
In short, the entire argument is an exercise in apologetics: tragically, these pre-
modern peasants are susceptible to ethnic mobilisation which can lead to genocide; 
happily, we modern urbanites have attained a level of civic nationalism which 
allows us to engage in democratic state-building without relapses into tribal 
barbarism. But the distinction between 'civic' and 'ethnic' nationalism is extremely 
dubious. 'Ethnicity' is as much an invented condition as 'race' (or indeed, 'nation'); 
political conflicts create ethnic divisions, not the other way around, and there 
is no nationalism which could not begin to adopt 'ethnic' distinctions in situations 
of social crisis. Given the way in which Scotland (and the Scottish national 
consciousness) has been implicated in the atrocities of the British Empire and the 
racism which accompanied them, can Nairn be so sure that these elements would 
not rise to the surface of Scottish Nationalism if economic conditions were bad 
enough? The legacy of Britishness is not escaped so easily. 
This is why the question of German fascism is important to Nairn's argument: Nazi 
Germany, for Marxists, is an example of a modern, developed capitalist power 
succumbing to extreme right wing nationalism in its fascist form. If it can be 
shown to be the product of peasant backwardness, rather than modern capitalist 
society, however, then nationalism emerges without responsibility for the Second 
World War and the Holocaust. Now, as Zygmunt Bauman has pointed out, the 
anti-Semitism which formed the core of Nazi ideology was, as Nairn suggests, a 
form of resistance to modernity.40 But this only explains the origins of anti-Semitic 
ideology, not how significant sections of the German nation, including its most 
'modern' sections, could succumb to it. As Geoff Eley has written, against earlier 
attempts to blame Nazism on supposed German backwardness, the answer lies 'in 
the immediate circumstances in which the Nazis came to power--namely, the 
successive conjunctures of the First World War, the post-war crisis of the 1917-23, 
and the world economic crisis after 1929'.41 Twenty years before the Nazis came to 
power, Germany as a whole had long since left 'rural backwardness' behind: 
In 1913, Germany was producing two-thirds of all European steel...double 
the British figure and not far short of the American one. She produced 
almost as much coal as Great Britain, and took many European markets 
from her. 
More importantly, the class structure changed as a result. In 1880 German society 
was one in which the majority of the population worked on the land and industry 
was confined to small workshops: 
In 1914, not much more than one third worked in agriculture (thirty five 
percent), almost two fifths in industry. But within industry there was a great 
change over from small firms employing a handful of workmen to middle 
sized and, most spectacularly of all, very large concentrated firms whose 
huge ugly factories dominated the Ruhr, Silesia, Saxony.42 
In short, Germany was not a society in transition to modernity but one which had 
arrived. Bauman's comments on the Holocaust are also appropriate to describe the 
frenzy of German nationalism which accompanied it: 'The Holocaust was born and 
executed in a modern rational society, at the high stage of our civilisation and at 
the peak of human cultural achievement, and for that reason it is a problem of that 
society, civilisation and culture.'43 
Nairn seems to believe that, against the 'big battalions', small is always beautiful. 
'Regrettably', he writes of Italian and German unification in the 19th century, 'both 
these great and exemplary unification projects ended in fascism'.44 The corollary of 
this is his enthusiasm for 'micro-states', a category in which he numbers Andorra, 
Gibraltar, Hong Kong, Jersey, Liechtenstein, Malta, Monaco and San 
Marino.45 Ulster, it is hinted, may also belong in this company. Is this the future of 
the international state system? There are at least three reasons why this is 
extremely unlikely. 
First, the list itself is extremely heterogeneous. Hong Kong was the creation of 
British imperialism (as are those other non-European 'micro-states' which Nairn 
unaccountably omits--Kuwait and the other Gulf dictatorships); Singapore 
developed out of the retreat from empire; both economies are primarily geared to 
the export market which developed out of the post-war boom. The European 
examples are remnants of the tiny pre-capitalist principalities which once covered 
Europe, and which have established themselves as off-shore tax havens. The 
circumstances in which these quite different states came into being are unlikely to 
be repeated. 
Secondly, these are not nations. The discussion of 'micro-states' is the one point in 
the book where Nairn blurs the difference between states and nations--with good 
reason, for the notion of a Monacoan nationalism is implausible to say the least. 
But so too, more importantly, is a Hong Kong nationalism. All of the forces which 
opposed the Chinese takeover, bourgeois and proletarian, did so on class, not 
nationalist grounds. The national identities which have developed in 'micro-states' 
tend to be those of the dominant power which guarantees their existence. In Ulster 
and Gibraltar (and the Falkland Islands) it is British nationalism which holds sway, 
not that of the territory itself. 
Thirdly, there is no reason to suppose that the future direction of nationalism will 
only involve the disintegration of existing nation states. It is at least as likely that 
nationalism will find expression in policies of aggressive integration. In this 
respect the failed Iraqi attempt to absorb Kuwait and the successful Chinese 
attempt to absorb Hong Kong reveal the shape of things to come as much or more 
than the splitting of Czechoslovakia into its component parts. 
What this section of the book does reveal, however, is another element which 
Nairn expects to form an eternal aspect of human existence. At one point he draws 
a revealing comparison between nationalism and the state, both of which are 'very 
unlikely to wither away'.46 His acceptance of the continued existence of the state is 
of course a necessary concomitant to his argument concerning the inescapability of 
nationalism but Nairn's eternal state is a capitalist state. Nairn lets this slip during a 
discussion of the components of the Eastern European revolutions: 
There was a popular, democratic rebellion against one party autocracy and 
state terror. There was an economic revulsion against the anti-capitalist 
command economies which for forty years had imposed forced-march 
development on the East. And thirdly there was the national mould into 
which these revolts were somehow inevitably flowing--the new salience of 
the ethnic, or (as in Bosnia) of the ethnic-religious in post-communist 
society.47 
Bourgeois democracies, capitalist economies, nation states--these are the 
components of our future, according to Nairn. He implies that anyone who objects 
to the disastrous imposition of multinational capitalism in Russia since 1991 is 
seeking a return to the genocidal certainties of the Cold War, as if these were the 
only alternatives facing humanity. In fact, the revolt against the market has already 
begun in Russia with a 'new development' in the class struggle: 'co-ordination of 
strike activity across international borders'. The Russian miners, for example, 
delayed taking strike action in 1996 until it could be co-ordinated with action by 
miners in the Ukraine.48 
The impossibility of internationalism? 
For Nairn, nationalism is so rooted in our nature that attempts to displace it in the 
name of international working class solidarity are misguided. Thus, 'An authentic 
Internationale can only be based upon the liberation of human nature: which means 
(in the first instance) nationalities, the precondition for democracy and individual 
emancipation...'49 As with his definition of the state, Nairn's own definition of 
internationalism is classically liberal: 'Internationalism, understood as a systematic 
outward-looking and inquiring attitude, an imaginative search into the meaning of 
other experiences, is the most valuable way of counteracting the disadvantages of 
this truth [that most people live in 'backyards']'.50 Now, even if I accepted the 
notion that discrete national cultures exist (which I do not), the outcome desired by 
Nairn would still be serial nationalism, rather than internationalism. This 
conclusion in fact predates Nairn's final break with Marxism, and is argued most 
clearly in 'Internationalism: A Critique'. 
He begins by distinguishing between 'internationality' and 'internationalism'. 
Internationality is the objective result of a capitalist world market in which the 
same social classes increasingly wear the same clothes, watch the same television 
programmes and consume the same food and drink, no matter where they are 
geographically situated. Economic and cultural integration has not, however, led to 
an identification of political interests between these people, even those which 
belong to the same social classes. Instead, they have tended to identify with their 
particular nation, which ultimately involves supporting the state which rules over 
it. With this much we can agree. The conclusion which Nairn draws, however, is 
that internationalism is therefore an ideology which, in both Marxist and liberal 
variants, sets out an essentially moral agenda for overcoming the dominance of 
nationalism: 'Internationalism poses a moral alternative to the way in which the 
world has actually gone since the Franco-Prussian War, the end of the First 
International and, more emphatically, since 1914'.51 
The reference to 1914 is significant. The collapse of the Second International was a 
defining moment for Nairn, but not because it demonstrated the betrayal of the 
international working class movement: 'There was neither betrayal nor regression 
in this sense'.52 On the contrary, Nairn argues the socialist parties simply 
recognised the reality of working class nationalism. Working classes are, at the 
moment of their initial formation, spontaneously internationalist and anti-capitalist; 
but this lasts only as long as it takes for them to become integrated into the system, 
with their own trade unions, co-operatives and political parties--a stage which had 
been realised in Europe long before 1914.53 Unable to accept the reality of the 
situation, however, Marxists retreated into an essentially religious adherence to the 
internationalist faith, which prevents them responding to the actual--and invariably 
national--crisis situations which do arise. 
Ultimately, conforming to the doctrine of internationalism led socialists into one of 
two dead ends, whether they were Stalinists or anti-Stalinists: 'The former usurped 
internationalism into the service of the Soviet Great Russian state, ultimately in 
still more theocratic terms; the latter responded to this and the other betrayals of 
the revolution either with distance and pessimism (like some Western Marxists) or 
with even greater idealisation of the international ideal.' Internationalism for Nairn 
has therefore essentially been maintained by socialist intellectuals as compensation 
for the defeats which have dogged the movement since 1917: 'As all-the-samism it 
is a standing invitation to the notion that "I" (the subject of international revolution, 
not the unshaven native of Aberdeen or Neusiedle-an-See) am better engaged 
supporting the revolution where it happens to be at, rather than where I (unshaven 
native) happen to be located'.54 But even this is no solution, for these distant 
revolutions have tended to be driven precisely by the nationalism which the 
subjects of international revolution oppose: 'To put it crudely--what orthodoxy 
required was a plausible way of supporting and not supporting national movements 
at the same time.' Lenin provided the theoretical solution to this conundrum: 
'Hence the general principle that all nationalist struggles and movements are bad; 
however, special and pragmatically identifiable circumstances may make them 
good--though only for a time, and in a highly qualified fashion.' Thus socialists are 
free to support national movements until they come to power, then denounce them 
for refusing to conform to the internationalist ideal: 'Each new tragedy of 
Balkanisation serves to underlie the ever fresh principle that only the international 
class struggle can prevent this kind of thing--if only the revisionist and narrow 
nationalists can be stopped, next time.' The alternative to this, Nairn argues, would 
be the psychologically impossible one of admitting the inevitability of nationalism. 
Marxists are therefore taxed with refusing to recognise the power of nationalism, 
with adhering to an illusionary theory of internationalism, and hypocritically 
supporting national movements (as 'exceptions') in the inevitable absence of that 
internationalism. There is, however, one final indictment to be added to the charge 
sheet. As Alex Callinicos has written, 'It has become part of the common sense 
beliefs of large sectors of the Western intelligentsia that every universalism is a 
masked particularism'.55 For Nairn, the universalism of internationalism disguises a 
particularism of big battalion nationalism, such as that displayed by socialists who 
opposed Scottish self-determination in favour of the British state, or, for that 
matter, those who opposed self-determination for Azerbeijan in favour of the old 
USSR. 
Part 2: The reality of nationalism--capitalism and reformism 
I have given Nairn the benefit of an extended presentation of his position, 
delivered as far as possible in his own words. I now want to examine the 
relationship of nationalism respectively to modernity, capitalism, reformism and 
internationalism, before returning to engage with Nairn's current position on 
Scotland. 
i) Nationalism as an aspect of modernity. According to Anthony Smith, there are 
three basic positions on the place of nations and nationalism in historical 
development. The first, appropriately enough, is primordialism: 'proponents of this 
view claim that nations and ethnic communities are the natural units of history and 
integral elements of human experience...[the] basic organising principles and 
bonds of human association throughout history.' The second is perennialism, 
whose advocates argue that 'units and sentiments found in the modern world are 
simply larger and more effective units and sentiments traceable in much earlier 
periods of human history'. The third and final position is modernism, where: 
...the nation is a purely modern phenomenon, a product of strictly modern 
developments like capitalism, bureaucracy and secular utilitarianism... 
Nations and nationalism, the argument continues, can be dated with some 
precision to the latter half of the 18th century...anything which appears to 
resemble it, either in antiquity or the Middle Ages must be understood as 
purely fortuitous or exceptional.56 
The modernist position (once held by Nairn) refuses all attempts to claim that 
nationalism is an inescapable part of the human condition. As the late Ernest 
Gellner wrote, the primordialist theory is the most commonly invoked of the three, 
but 'in one sense it is barely a theory, because it treats the principle as something 
inherent in human nature, or the very principles of social organisation, so obvious 
as not really to require explanation.' If anyone points out that for the most of 
human existence this aspect of our nature has been absent, nationalists have an 
answer: 
Nationalists are in fact aware of the evidence which makes some of us 
contest the universality of nationalist sentiments: they do know, often with 
anger, that in many societies and many historical periods, nationalism is 
conspicuous by its absence. They know it, with great bitterness, especially 
when it relates to the recent past of their own nation. But they explain it in 
their own way, and their explanation is contained in what is probably the 
most commonly used word in the nationalist vocabulary: awakening.57 
Nairn is aware of Gellner's critique,58 yet the notion of 'awakening' is the basis of 
his explanation for the revival of Scottish nationalism and indeed of all other 
nationalisms. The reader may have already noted his use of the term in passing--
'As far as the "bourgeois" aspects of the 1970s national movement are concerned, I 
remain convinced that in our specific conditions only the middle strata could have 
brought about such an awakening'--but now we learn that 'the Treaty of Union 
came just in time to bury a nascent Scottish nationalism, but could only put it into a 
shallow grave.' And from this grave, 'The corpse may simply step out from 
temporary interment to claim his rights'.59 In a sense this goes one better than 
Gellner: not only an awakening but a veritable second coming. We will examine 
the Lazarus of European nationalisms at the conclusion of this article. For the 
moment, however, let us stick with the question of modernity. 
Those who accept that nationalism is a modern phenomenon tend to uphold one of 
two main theoretical approaches. On the one hand, followers of the German 
sociologist Max Weber argue that nations are a product of the process which they 
call modernisation, particularly during the phase involving industrialisation. On the 
other, Marxists argue that these terms ignore the fact that 'modernising' societies 
have been subject to a much more specific process: domination by the capitalist 
mode of production. It was the first of these approaches, embodied in the work of 
Ernest Gellner, which influenced Nairn in his original reflections on the national 
question, but Nairn avoided the issue by treating modernity and capitalism as 
equivalent.60 
Since Nairn now treats nationalism as a permanent aspect of the human condition, 
he has consequently dissociated it from both modernisation and the capitalist mode 
of production (although, as we have seen, he is happy to use the notion of a 
transition from 'traditional' to 'modern' societies as an explanation for nationalisms 
of which he disapproves). 
ii) Nationalism and capitalism. Once a nation state has been established, those who 
control the state apparatus always seek to consolidate the hold of 'national 
consciousness' among the people who inhabit the state territory. As Nigel Harris 
puts it, 'Once the boundary is beaten back and troops posted around the perimeter, 
the state undertakes to colonise all within, to drill all the inhabitants who find 
themselves trapped behind the fence with an invented common inheritance of 
loyalty, supposedly to a common culture or way of life, but in practice to a 
particular state.'61 This certainly happens, although Nairn is largely silent on the 
issue, but the suggestion that nationalism exists purely as the result of 
indoctrination is hardly the whole explanation. Why do workers support nationalist 
movements before states are established? Why do they accept it afterwards? One 
reason is clearly that bourgeois ideology is at its most convincing when it appears 
to confirm the inevitably of the world as it is organised under capitalism, which is 
one consisting of actual or potential nation states. There is, however, another 
reason. Nairn is correct to suggest that nationalism provides a framework of 
identity, a sense of 'belonging'; the question is whether it is the only form of 
consciousness which can play this role. 
Benedict Anderson once suggested that the origins of national consciousness lay in 
the collapse of 'three fundamental cultural conceptions' during the rise of 
capitalism: the identification of 'a particular script-language' (such as Latin in 
Christendom) with access to religious truth; the belief that society was organised in 
a natural hierarchy, at the summit of which were 'monarchs who were persons 
apart from other human beings'; and a view of the indistinguishability of 
cosmology and history which rendered 'the origins of the world and of men 
essentially identical'. The interconnected decline of these three meant that human 
beings required 'a new way of linking fraternity, power and time meaningfully 
together'.62 As Chris Harman has noted, this argument makes the connection of 
nationalism with capitalist development contingent rather than necessary, with the 
latter simply allowing expression to an 'existential yearning', providing an outlet 
for 'the satisfaction of innate psychological needs'.63 It is, however, possible to 
reformulate the position held by Anderson in a way which relies not on a 
conception of the eternal human condition--which would be to surrender to the 
position held by Nairn--but on the human needs which are created by capitalism.64 
As George Kerevan once wrote, ironically in Nairn's journal, The Bulletin Of 
Scottish Politics: 
If civil society separates itself from people's social-political designation (as 
opposed to their party-political designation); if individuals only face one 
another in the market connected in only one all-embracing unit of civil 
society--the nation... A mass social allegiance is born; an allegiance to 
something beyond the class antagonisms of civil society, beyond language, 
beyond ethnicity, beyond geography: nationalism. For the feudal peasant, 
whose unfreedom is not masked by the market, no such allegiance is 
possible. 
For workers under capitalism, however, such an allegiance is not only possible, it 
is--from the point of view of the capitalist class in individual nations--absolutely 
necessary; for without it, the danger is always that workers will identify not with 
the nation in which they happen to be situated, but with the class to which they are 
condemned to belong, regardless of the accident of geographical location. 
Consequently, as Kerevan points out, workers are confronted by 'two materially 
conditioned allegiances'. On the one hand, 'Nationalism, reflecting the social 
position of the individual caught in the allegiances imposed by civil society and its 
exterior state.' On the other, 'Proletarian internationalism, reflecting the class 
position of the worker and the kernel of the socialist mode of production 
developing within capitalism.' The two are quite different in nature: 'The former is 
materially determined by the external appearance of bourgeois society, the latter by 
its essence'.65 
iii) Nationalism and reformism. Nationalism should not therefore be seen as 
something which only 'happens' during separatist movements on the one hand, or 
during fascist and imperialist manifestations on the other. The capitalist system 
generates nationalism as a necessary, everyday condition of its existence. 
Consequently, it forms part of the reformist consciousness among the working 
class. Reformism, long before it becomes embodied in organisation, is produced by 
the tension between accepting the system as a unchanging feature of human life, 
and rejecting the way in which specific aspects of it actually impact on our lives. 
The task for revolutionaries is, as it were, to expand this 'rejectionist' side of 
reformist consciousness until it becomes total, proving through a combination of 
argument and activity that, for example, the inadequacy of our schools is neither 
accidental nor incidental, but a direct effect of how the system operates. 
The difficulty is that reformist political organisations are constantly pulling in the 
opposite direction, reinforcing nationalism at the same time as they encourage 
workers to accept the system. This is for two reasons. The first is the well known 
tendency of reformist parties to appeal to the lowest levels of working class 
consciousness, rather than attempt to raise them; to pander to the worst forms of 
working class prejudice rather than attempt to challenge it. The second is that these 
reformists hope to take over national government office themselves--despite all the 
talk of globalisation, the assumption is still that the national state is the arena in 
which 'politics' is conducted. Nairn therefore completely underestimates (or rather, 
wilfully disregards) the extent to which the reformist and Stalinist left have been 
responsible for the continued dominance of nationalist consciousness among the 
working class under capitalism.66 Rather than having no alternative but to reflect 
an overwhelming nationalist feeling among the working class, they consciously 
attempt to foster these feelings.67 Within the trade unions this can occur in two 
ways, both of which can be illustrated from the experience of the labour movement 
in Scotland. 
The first is the argument that particular industries or workplaces belong to 'the 
nation', rather than to capitalist firms or (more rarely these days) the capitalist state. 
The disastrous effects of this ideology became apparent during the Miners' Strike 
of 1984-1985.68 One of the key objectives of the NUM was to stop steel production 
nationally. Unfortunately the leadership relied on their fellow officials in the steel 
unions delivering this rather than picketing out the steel workers. The latter had 
been badly defeated in the steel strike of 1980 and more than half the workforce 
had been lost in the ensuing three years. The leadership of the Iron and Steel 
Trades Confederation opposed shutting down steel production. 
It was at this point that the Scottish nationalist argument kicked in. In Scotland, the 
NUM Area officials signed an agreement allowing enough coal to enter the strip 
mill at Ravenscraig in Motherwell to keep the furnaces operating. The reason given 
by Area President Mick McGahey was that the deal was 'in the interests of 
Scotland's industrial future'. In fact, not only did the amount of coal entering 
Ravenscraig not drop from its normal levels to that required on a care-and-
maintenance basis, it increased. Picketing by the miners and their supporters was 
unable to close the plant in the absence of practical solidarity from other unions or 
the STUC. And so the 'Scottish national interest' helped play its part in the defeat 
of the NUM, the destruction of the British mining industry and the perpetuation of 
Tory rule for another 12 years. 
Pursuit of the national interest also left a legacy of division within the Scottish 
working class which should not be underestimated. Joe Owens, a miner who 
worked at Polkemmet Colliery in East Lothian before the strike, gave vent to his 
feelings in an interview several years later: 
And when the miners asked the men at Ravenscraig not to accept imported 
coal, they just put two fingers up at them, which was another contributing 
factor to the closure of Polkemmet. Since that event, of course, Ravenscraig 
has been closed and they're looking for everybody's sympathy after turning 
down the miners' appeals. I've no sympathy for them, same as I've none for 
the Nottinghamshire miners [ie who formed the scab Union of Democratic 
Mineworkers during the strike]. I'm actually praying for pits to close in 
Nottingham so that I can laugh at them.69 
The second way in which nationalism is fostered by the reformist bureaucracy is in 
the advocacy of all-class, pan-Scottish alliance as the way to defend jobs. Despite 
the comments quoted above, delegates at the Scottish NUM conference in June 
1990 voted to support the campaign to save Ravenscraig from closure, and union 
convener Tommy Brennan was even invited to speak at the annual Miners' Gala in 
Edinburgh. But this was simply the latest in a series of campaigns which had 
followed the same disastrous course over every threatened closure since the Upper 
Clyde Shipbuilders' work-in of 1971. The composition of these coalitions, 
invariably led by the Scottish TUC, was summarised by one friendly critic as 
consisting of 'trade unionists, clergymen, artists, politicians of various hue [ie they 
included Tories], thinkers, councillors, professionals, and the rest'.70 They 
inevitably refused to consider industrial action and focused instead on 'mobilising 
Scottish public opinion' on the one hand (unnecessarily, since in most cases it was 
already in sympathy with the threatened workers) and attempting to 'persuade' the 
government to intervene (pointlessly, since it was usually in complete agreement 
with the employers). Of these campaigns, only the first at Upper Clyde 
Shipbuilders achieved any kind of success, and that because it was accompanied by 
a militant occupation which took place in the context of the great upturn in British 
working class struggle of the early 1970s. The others--Singer at Clydebank, the 
Carron Iron Works, British Leyland at Bathgate, the Corpach paper mill, the 
Invergordon smelter, Linwood, Caterpillar, Ravenscraig--took place in a period of 
defeat and contributed to extending it by their failure. As Keith Aitken writes: 
Retrospection yields the dispiriting, and somehow surprising, realisation 
that almost none of the eighties issue coalitions achieved their primary 
objectives. They did not save Caterpillar or Ravenscraig. They did not 
change government policy on health, devolution or the economy.71 
It was not until the Timex workers in Dundee fought back in 1993 that this strategy 
was effectively challenged, and not until the victory of the Glacier RPB workers in 
Glasgow during 1996 that the cycle of disaster was broken, although there is no 
sign that the STUC have learned any lessons from the experience. And there can be 
little doubt that in an independent Scotland there will be increased reformist 
pressure on workers, both to identify with 'their' capitalism against that of other 
rival nations, and to unite with other social classes in Scotland to 'solve' the local 
manifestations of the global crisis. The point is that what Nairn identifies as the 
dominance of nationalism within the working class is to a large extent the 
dominance of reformism, of which nationalism is a necessary component. But if 
nationalism in this sense is part of reformist consciousness then it can be 
challenged in exactly the same way as reformism can in every other sphere of life. 
Indeed, one might say that workers remain attached to nationalist loyalties to the 
extent that they remain subject to reformist consciousness. 
iv) Nationalism and internationalism. Internationalism is as much a component of 
revolutionary consciousness and politics as nationalism is of reformist 
consciousness and politics. It has two aspects. On the one hand, it involves workers 
in one nation giving solidarity to workers in other nations, even at a cost to 
themselves: for example, the support given to the Liverpool dockers from as far 
afield as the United States and Australia. Here the issue is the unity of working 
class interests against employers or the state, regardless of national boundaries. On 
the other hand, internationalism also involves workers in one nation giving 
solidarity to the national aspirations of the people of another nation, who will--by 
definition--include non-workers and are usually led by quite alien class forces: for 
example, the opposition mounted in both Britain and the US to the bombing of 
Iraq. 
A small but illuminating example of both aspects--solidarity with both a working 
class and a nation--was once given, appropriately enough, in Nairn's native region 
of Fife. In 1974, a year after the military coup in Chile, the Chilean 
submarine O'Brien docked in Greenock in order that tailshafts could be repaired, 
protected and then sent back to South America as spares. When the tailshafts 
arrived at the Royal Navy dockyard at Rosyth the TGWU shop stewards in the 
stores organisation refused to release them and wrote to the Ministry of Defence 
informing it 'that no future Chilean Navy work will be done in Rosyth dockyard 
until the fascist junta is removed and a freely, democratically elected government 
put in power and human rights restored in Chile'. The blacking went on for four 
years until the MOD eventually agreed that no work would be carried out or 
supplies provided to the junta by that dockyard. Rosyth was not traditionally a 
militant workplace; it had participated in the 'Hands Off Russia' agitation in 1919, 
but in that case the driving force had been a group of Portsmouth engineers 
temporarily based in Fife. In 1974 the catalyst for action was a group of left wing 
stewards who were active locally in the Labour Party, demonstrating that where 
internationalist arguments are consistently put, they can influence the actions of 
workers.72 
Internationalism is not simply a moral imperative which workers can respond to or 
not, according to inclination, but a practical necessity given the nature of the 
capitalist order. The Fife shipyard workers referred to above may not have been 
immediately threatened by a military dictatorship, but they understood that the ease 
or difficulty with which the junta was able to go about its business in the world 
would have a bearing on whether other ruling classes were inclined to go down the 
road to repression. Furthermore, it is a necessity which the interconnectedness of 
the system--its 'internationality', to use Nairn's phrase--makes possible because it is 
not simply a question of the clothes people wear or the television programmes they 
watch, but a shared relationship to the reproduction of an international system. At a 
trade union level, the support shown by the Australian maritime union to the 
Liverpool dockers was at least partly a recognition that their own employers were 
planning a similar onslaught--which eventually came within weeks of the dispute 
coming to an end.73 It is also true that the cultural aspects of 'internationality', 
notably the growth of a global media, have simply made people more aware of the 
similarity between their struggles and those happening in other parts of the world. 
I want, however, to dwell briefly on the second aspect of internationalism, since it 
is one of the biggest sources of confusion, not least to Nairn, who persistently 
mistakes the effect of Stalinism (including the effect it has had on 'orthodox' 
Trotskyism) and the ideological rubbish left in its wake for the genuine Marxist 
position. It is important to state first of all that there is no metaphysical 'right of 
nations to self-determination' (the unfortunate title of Lenin's otherwise 
indispensable pamphlet notwithstanding). Nor, contrary to what Nairn asserts, has 
the Marxist position ever been to support 'exceptional' or 'good' nationalisms. 
Socialists never support nationalism but they do support specific national 
demands under certain conditions. What are these? 
This question is often reduced to the attitude taken by Marxists to oppressed 
peoples struggling against imperialism and its local agents--understandably, since 
for more than the first half of this century this issue largely was 'the national 
question'. The basis of socialist support for these nationalist movements was set out 
in the debates at the first four Congresses of the Communist International; the rise 
to full human dignity of peoples who had previously been regarded (and in some 
cases regarded themselves) as naturally inferior to their colonial masters, the 
weakening effect which national revolts had on the world system as a whole, the 
opportunity which they gave for socialists to break workers in the West from 
racism and support for imperialism and, consequently, to demonstrate to the 
colonial peoples that Western workers supported them rather than their 'own' 
capitalists or state. None of this meant supporting the politics of the national 
movements themselves. Not the least distorting effect of Stalinism was to convince 
the majority of the international left that these national movements were socialist 
in content (so that when the true nature of, say, the Vietnamese regime was 
exposed it contributed to disillusion with the very idea of socialism). Since the end 
of Stalinism this view has nevertheless remained alive, but in the form of arguing 
that in every situation there must be one national movement which is oppressed 
and deserves support. 
For socialists, however, the question of support for particular national demands 
(not for particular nationalisms) is determined by their relationship to the struggle 
for socialism, regardless of whether the nation concerned is oppressed or not. 
Furthermore, it should openly be undertaken with the purpose of weakening the 
support of workers for that nationalism. In this context several questions have to 
asked. Does support strengthen or weaken the capitalist or imperialist state? Does 
support strengthen or weaken the class consciousness and organisation of the 
working class? Does support strengthen or weaken the tolerance of people of 
different nations or 'races' for each other? These are not always easy questions to 
answer, particularly where (as in Scotland) no element of national oppression is 
involved. Nevertheless, to try and answer them seems preferable to conceding in 
advance both the legitimacy of every nationalism and our inability to make any 
value judgements between them. 
Politics and the modern Lazarus 
The previous paragraph brought us back to Scotland, our starting point. Let us 
examine Nairn's current views on this subject, then conclude. First, we need to 
understand his assessment of contemporary Scottish nationalism. According to 
Nairn, the political nationalism which arose in the 1960s 'was not solely a wish for 
exit from the United Kingdom: it was, in effect, the desire to escape from "civil 
society" and resume business as a political society' in his native Scotland, where, 
we learn, 'a "civil" social order (with the sense of "decency", privacy, individual 
and group minority rights, freedom of initiative and enterprise, etc) depends in the 
long run upon an appropriately civil form of national identity'.74 From this 
perspective, 'civil society' is merely 'a fall-back position for middle class 
internationalists' opposed to Scottish nationalism.75 It should not be thought, 
however, that Nairn is opposed to the middle class as such; on the contrary, they 
must be at the heart of the Scottish nationalist project. 
In fact, at one level, Nairn is far more honest about the class basis of Scottish 
nationalism than the SNP could ever be: 'Though led in the name of a 
indeterminate "people", national liberation struggle can only be led by certain 
people with more determinate and vested interests in the process; nor could it 
conceivably be otherwise.' And who is this class in Scotland? According to Nairn, 
it is the one which 'runs Scotland--the institutional middle class', with which he 
identifies himself as a 'recalcitrant member': 'No collective presumption is intended 
here, for the important term is "runs": the Scottish institutional middle class has 
never ruled this country, it merely manages it'.76 Actually, no middle class--
institutional or not--has ever ruled any country, the bourgeoisie does that. For 
Nairn, however, failure to win the support of the former group was at the root of 
the SNP's inability to make an electoral breakthrough: 'In this sense, perhaps, the 
SNP version of national identity has never been half "bourgeois" enough--it was a 
twopenny solution aimed at a bit of everyone and no one in particular.' However, 
the Scottish middle class was now beginning to take its national identity seriously 
under 'the lash of Thatcherism'.77 
Now, there is a sense in which this is absolutely correct. The original class basis 
for the SNP during the 1960s and 1970s was the old petty bourgeoisie, 'the small 
man, the frustrated Scottish businessman smelling profit in oil yet unable to cash 
in, only to spectate, and the lower middle class and professional elements watching 
their hard non- status and security disappear in the furnace of inflation'.78 There is 
no doubt that elements of the new middle class are now dominant within the SNP, 
their presence symbolised by the leadership of former Bank of Scotland economist 
Alex Salmond. The important fact here, however, is that the working class has not 
been won over to political nationalism, a fact of which Nairn is no doubt aware, 
but which has no great significance for him precisely because he now regards 
working class politics as irrelevant. For revolutionaries, however, it is crucial. Yet 
the failure of Scottish nationalism in this respect is often unappreciated both inside 
and outside Scotland, largely as a result of misinterpreting two kinds of opinion 
poll. 
The first are those which show a growing tendency for respondents to claim that 
they feel more Scottish than British (33 percent in June 1998 compared to 29 
percent in September 1991).79 Yet this indicates an increase in national 
consciousness, not nationalism as such, although the former is a necessary 
precondition of the latter. This consciousness has been shared, since the latter half 
of the 18th century, with a sense of Britishness, but assertion of the Scottish 'side' 
of this dual identity has no necessary political implications. As Joyce McMillan 
once noted, 'Scottish identity requires constant assertion, whereas British identity is 
something taken for granted by every institution with which [the Scots] have to 
deal, and inclined to assert itself in the half conscious assumption that politics is 
something that happens at Westminster'.80 
The point here is not that there is anything desirable about feeling British rather 
than Scottish or any other nationality but rather that, precisely because political and 
economic issues have tended to be resolved at a British level, that side of the 
national identity is where class unity is usually expressed. Britishness tends to be 
assumed at some level by all classes in Scotland (the same poll cited above shows 
that only 28 percent of Scots do not feel British to any degree). A genuine 
hardening of Scottish consciousness into a political nationalism, precisely because 
its goal would be to establish a new state, would necessarily be accompanied by an 
emphasis on the unity of all Scots against that of British workers. 
The second set of polls show a growing tendency for Scots to say that they would 
vote for independence in a referendum about the constitutional future and vote for 
the SNP in the Scottish Parliament: the most recent shows 56 percent opting for the 
former and 40 percent for latter--the same percentage as those saying they would 
vote for Labour.81 What these results both demonstrate is not some asocial upsurge 
of primeval nationalism, but a response to the actions of the Blair government. The 
SNP made few advances in working class areas at the general election of 1997. 
Despite posturing as the inheritor of Labour's social democratic past it gained only 
two Tory seats in predominantly rural areas. Yet after the hopes of 1 May 1997 
were dashed, the SNP provides an electorally credible and seemingly left wing 
alternative for Scottish voters of a type which is not (and cannot be) available in 
England. The SNP is not a reformist party like Labour, but we are dealing here 
with perception, not reality.82 
Two other points of interest arising from these polls deserve to be mentioned. First, 
that the numbers claiming to favour independence for Scotland exceed by 16 
percent those claiming they would vote for the SNP, which suggests that 
independence as means of achieving certain political objectives and Scottish 
nationalism as a set of political beliefs are not necessarily seen as linked. Secondly, 
these are voting intentions for the Scottish Parliament, not Westminster, where the 
SNP has consistently failed to achieve levels of Labour support, which suggests 
that voting for the SNP might be seen as a luxury which can be indulged without 
the threat of doing too much damage. 
The establishment of a Scottish Parliament was, after the election of a Labour 
government, the solution most commonly offered by reformists to problems of the 
working class in Scotland during the years of Tory rule. Given the nature of the 
current Labour government, it comes as no surprise that those who are anxious to 
take the path of least resistance have focused still more on what the parliament will 
deliver. Does Nairn share these illusions? Here we return full circle to the question 
of the British state. Nairn so loathes the aged beast that his reaction to the Labour 
victory on 1 May 1997 was very restrained.83Nairn correctly saw that Blair would 
do nothing to disturb the existing set-up, unless forced to, but completely 
misunderstands what lay behind the vote for a parliament with 'tax varying' powers 
on 13 September 1997: 'The most important thing for a recalled Parliament to 
decide, I need hardly point out, is not raising or lowering income tax by a few 
percent. It will be whether to alter the conditions of UK affiliation'.84 
Nairn now seems confident that this will happen. In a speech to the annual 
conference of the Centre of Research into Elections and Social Trends during 
November 1997 he foresaw that: 'Within the crumbling clam-shell of British 
sovereignty, serious home rule...will find it hard to avoid de 
facto sovereignty'.85 There are two issues here. 
First, what is sovereignty for, exactly? This obsession with sovereignty for its own 
sake (taking into account Nairn's concern to protect 'enterprise') is about the most 
right wing position available within the pan-nationalist camp. 
Secondly, are the 'conditions of UK affiliation' the central issue for most Scots? 
The 1997 Scottish Election Survey found that 54 percent of respondents expected 
'the economy' to be better after the establishment of a Scottish Parliament (13 
percent by 'a lot', 41 percent by 'a little'), 38 percent expected unemployment to be 
better (6 percent and 32 percent), 62 percent expected education to be better (17 
percent and 45 percent) and 60 percent expected the NHS to be better (16 percent 
and 44 percent).86 These findings tend to suggest two conclusions. One is that the 
main reasons why people want a Scottish Parliament are immediate social issues, 
not abstractions about sovereignty. The other is that, even so, they do not expect it 
to make more than marginal improvements to the quality of their lives. Nairn, on 
the other hand, believes that a Scottish polity will somehow be innately beneficent. 
Writing of the anti Poll Tax campaign he notes that: 'Everyone there... knew 
perfectly well that no Scottish legislation would ever conceivably have imposed 
such a tax to begin with'.87 As is well known, the powers enjoyed by the parliament 
will be extremely limited, although opportunities will exist for agitation and 
propaganda around issues like education where it does have some control. The 
voting system for the elections of May 1999 has been deliberately devised to 
prevent as far as possible any individuals or organisations from outside the 
established parties getting elected. Furthermore, it is likely to produce a coalition 
politics in which both Labour and the SNP will be able to claim that they are 
unable to carry out radical policies because of the need to placate their coalition 
partners, whoever they are. Finally, the process by which the Labour candidates 
has been selected has eliminated all but a few token left wingers in favour of 
faithful Blairites. On the whole, the prospects of the Scottish Parliament producing 
something as offensive as the Poll Tax are probably rather high. 
Nairn is obviously aware of all this, but probably thinks that an increase in power 
for the parliament is inevitable, its very existence leading a heightened desire for 
more 'sovereignty'. But this in turn is predicated on the false belief that 
'sovereignty' is a matter of importance to the majority of Scots. What most working 
class Scots want is the control over their lives and conditions that no bourgeois 
parliament in Westminster or Holyrood can give them--the control which 
bourgeois parliaments are in fact specifically designed to prevent working class 
people achieving. When it becomes apparent that the Scottish Parliament will not 
live up to even the minimum expectations invested in it, then a number of 
responses are possible. One might be the outcome desired by Nairn (and in a more 
directly electoral way by the SNP), where parliamentary failure is seen as 
stemming from the absence of Scottish sovereignty and leads to the demand for 
independent nationhood becoming irresistible. Another might be that failure 
condemns it to irrelevance, and instead of provoking high levels of public interest 
it becomes the object of the same sort of bemused contempt with which local 
authorities are currently viewed. Still another might be that its failures are seen, not 
as the result of a lack of independence, but because it is a reformist institution 
incapable of challenging capitalism in Scotland or anywhere else. The latter 
perception is, of course, correct and the one which revolutionaries will seek to 
make hegemonic among the working class. If we fail, it will be for political 
reasons, not because our audience was genetically predisposed to embrace 
nationalism. 
One final point is worth considering. Nairn always tended to treat the British state 
as if it had a life of its own, apart from the class interests which it represents. His 
argument nevertheless assumed that 'the break-up of Britain' would represent a 
defeat for the British ruling class, and that it would oppose the departure of 
Scotland--indeed, this was one of the very reasons why the idea of Scottish 
independence had such a resonance on the left. It is by no means certain, however, 
that the British ruling class will necessarily remain committed to the preservation 
of the British state in its current form, if it can be demonstrated that other 
constitutional arrangements will equally serve their interests to the same extent. As 
early as 1990, The Economist, playing its usual role as outrider for the most 
extreme doctrines of free market ideology, suggested in a leader article that there 
might be advantages in Scotland achieving independence: 'Unable to rely on 
handouts from the British exchequer, Scotland's political classes would take 
unpopular closure decisions for themselves, or leave managers free to do so.' The 
editorial looked forward to 'the replacement of today's half angry, half embarrassed 
dependency status by a grown up political culture', capable of closing down plants 
like Ravenscraig without concession to 'industrial romanticism'.88 
This was a lone voice at the time, but there are signs that the bourgeoisie 
themselves--and not just their ideologists--might now be prepared to contemplate 
full independence, not on free market doctrinal grounds, but as part of the search 
for stability. The Financial Times reported recently that 'what worries business is 
the prospect of endless uncertainty and altercation over Scotland's status, rather 
than the nature of the eventual settlement'.89 The declining Scottish economy is 
unlikely to reproduce the relative success of Catalonian devolution. The prospect 
of the national question becoming a permanent feature of Scottish politics, as it has 
become in Quebec, would therefore make independence attractive simply because 
it would decide the issue once and for all. This is a view which may gather strength 
once the parliament is established. At the moment, much more typical is Andrew 
Neil's talk of creating a 'new Unionism...within a much more devolved, even 
federalist, United Kingdom', but Neil--once accurately described by Nairn as an 
'archetypal Scotch crawler'--will ultimately be less important in deciding the path 
of the British state than the capitalists he admires so much.90 If Scottish 
independence does become something that the British capitalist class can live with, 
then one of the key arguments on the left for supporting it--that it is against the 
interests of the bourgeoisie--will have effectively dissolved. One of the tragedies of 
Nairn's trajectory towards the acceptance of 'enterprise' is that this is no longer 
even an issue for him. 
'We are all German Jews' 
In one of the essays in Faces Of Nationalism, Nairn reviews The Race Gallery, by 
Marek Kohn, from which he extracts two morals. The first is that 'Human 
biological diversity needs to be explored not denied.' And the second is that 
'diversity needs some new defences in order to survive'. The reader will have no 
difficulty in guessing what the nature of these new defences are likely to be. Nairn 
is thinking here in particular of the Roma population of East Central Europe, who 
have suffered renewed levels of racism since the fall of Stalinism. Needless to say, 
as far as Nairn is concerned there is no possibility that this can be resisted; the 
Roma must simply establish their own nationalism in opposition which will 
'inevitably' be 'ethno-linguistic or "racial".'91 
The tragedy of Nairn's long retreat from Marxism is that for one brief moment he 
did recognise, in all its grandeur, the possibilities for socialist revolution, not as a 
myth, but as an actuality which provided the solution to racial and national 
oppression: 
When de Gaulle spoke with condescension of 'the new blood of France', to 
be 'given a voice' after May, he revealed only his own ignorance of a 
generation that had spewed out that 'France' along with the priests, 
professors and policemen, and adopted 'Nous sommes tous des Juifs-
Allemands' as its motto, doing more for the cause of internationalism and 
European unity in one day than the governments and labour bureaucracies 
of Western Europe had achieved in twenty years.92 
'Nous sommes tous des Juifs-Allemands'--'We are all German Jews'--was the 
slogan of the French students and workers who demonstrated in May 1968 after 
attacks on Daniel Cohn-Bendit as a 'German Jew' in the bourgeois press had led to 
his attempted assassination. Nairn could once use the very same slogan against the 
paltry vision offered to Scotland by nationalism: 'To acquiesce in the SNP's version 
of our future, in the year where a new generation cried "Nous sommes tous des 
Juifs-Allemands" before the Palais Bourbon and ground the nationalism of the past 
to dust at the Saarbrucken bridge, is merely an uninteresting form of suicide'.93 It 
seems likely that when another new generation arises to proclaim themselves 
German Jews (or perhaps Punjabi Scots), Nairn will now be one of those pressing 
the hemlock into our hands. 'A false political theory bears within itself its own 
punishment', wrote Trotsky in 1933.94 There is no need for the working class in 
Scotland or anywhere else to suffer that punishment, but one prerequisite for 
escaping it is precisely to see ourselves primarily as workers, and to reject all 
theories which would have us believe that the accidental fact of Scottish 
nationhood, or any other, is what will determine our fate. 
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